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The IIJD Newsletter:
 
Niger: A Cause for Concern
By Sam Plapinger, IIJD
August 5th, 2009
 

In early July, President Obama spoke in Accra, Ghana, on the importance of good governance and democratic institutions.  Obama stated that “in the 21st century, capable, reliable, and transparent institutions are the key to success,” and that “history is…not with those who use coups or change Constitutions to stay in power.  Africa doesn’t need strongmen; it needs strong institutions.”  Obama said that the US has “a responsibility to support those who act responsibly and to isolate those who don’t,” and that the US will “increase assistance for responsible individuals and institutions, with a focus on supporting good governance.”     

Just a few hundred miles to the northeast, President Tandja of Niger illustrated the counterpoint to Obama’s vision of good governemance. 

On August 4th, 2009, a referendum to suspend the current constitution and allow for the drafting of a new constitution that would have no term limits was passed in Niger.  The 1999 Nigerien Constitution allows the President to serve a maximum of two terms and specifically prohibits the amendment of this provision.  President Tandja Mamadou is in his second and final five-year term, which ends in December 2009, and will now be allowed to run in the August 20th elections.

Tandja’s push for a referendum was not without opposition.  On May 26th, the Constitutional Court of Niger had ruled that the proposed referendum was unconstitutional and was a violation of the oath Tandja had taken on the Qur’an; in response, Tandja dissolved the Court.    Lawyers across Niger then went on a one-day strike to protest the President’s dissolution of the Constitutional Court.   Under Niger’s constitution, the Constitutional Court cannot be dissolved by anyone, and the judges of the court cannot be removed until 2012 (the end of their six-year terms).  Only hours after dissolving the Court, Tandja dissolved the National Assembly after two opposition political parties, the ANDP-Zaman Lahiya and CDS-Rahama, stated that they would oppose the referendum proposal.   He then gave himself “exceptional powers” to govern by decree. 

This is just the latest illustration of the lack of executive respect concerning presidential term limits and constitutions.  In 2008, President Paul Biya of Cameroon was successful (with the help of the National Assembly) in his bid to revise the constitution to allow him to run for a third term, setting off riots throughout Cameroon that resulted in over 100 deaths and battles between civilians and troops.  Around 1,500-2,000 arrests were made (including members of the political opposition); violations of legal rights have been reported.  

Other presidents who have been successful in this matter are Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso, Idriss Deby of Chad, Omar Bongo of Gabon, Lansana Conte of Guinea, Sam Nujoma of Namibia, Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda.  Unsuccessful attempts have been made by Baliki Muluzi of Malawi, Frederick Chiluba of Zambia, and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria; however, all three handpicked a successor candidate and continued to have an influence on the executive. 

With the dawn of the 1990’s came a wave of new African constitutions: 48 of the continent’s 53 countries adopted new constitutions, with 33 of those 48 constitutions adopting presidential term limits.   The main reason given for the term limit provisions was to “prevent arbitrary and violent rule often associated with lifelong presidencies from recurring.”   Despite all the work that has gone into attempting to create effective democratic institutions on the continent, only one African country, Cape Verde, has achieved the highest rating of “Free” from “Freedom House: Freedom in the World,” which rates countries based on the level of political rights and civil liberties citizens have in their respective countries.

Many of the new constitutions were influenced largely by the ideas of democratic governance found in the US Constitution, such as the separation of powers and a system of checks and balances between the three independent branches of government.  In practice, however, the executive effectively had unchecked powers and tended to dominate the other two branches of government.  The appointment process of the members to government councils, such as constitutional councils or electoral commissions, was usually granted to the executive. This allowed for widespread executive interference in functions that needed to be independent in order for accountability and good governance to persist.  The presence of laws prohibiting or limiting the existence of other political parties gave tremendous power and influence to the ruling party.  Several constitutions gave the executive the power to dissolve the legislature, thus compromising the system of checks and balances needed for democratic governance. 

The combination of the aforementioned factors has led to the success of the executive in lifting the constitutional term limits in the countries at hand.  In the cases of Deby (Chad), Conte (Guinea), and Abidine (Tunisia), a national referendum to lift the presidential term limits was held and subsequently passed among accusations of election fraud and boycotting by the opposition; however, no investigations were made by any of the governments.  The power of political parties is reflected in the fact that in Biya (Cameroon), Nujoma (Namibia), Eyadema (Togo), and Museveni (Uganda), the constitutional amendment lifting presidential term limits was passed by the legislature, which in all four cases had managed to obtain a two-thirds majority in favor of the ruling party at the time of the passage of the amendment due to rigged parliamentary elections.  In the case of Compaore (Burkina Faso) and Bouteflika (Algeria), the given executive power to appoint members of constitutional councils compromised the ability of those councils to check the executive’s powers; in both cases, the respective councils ruled in favor of the President.  In Niger, the power to dissolve the legislature has allowed Tandja to proceed on with his quest to amend the constitution and to seek a third term.  

The IIJD believes that “the absence of a clear separation of power between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, and the lack of accountability, transparency, and discipline within the government, are obvious signs of the failure to achieve genuine democratic rule and good governance.”  In the cases discussed, the lack of a separation of powers in practice has allowed the executive to exert undue influence on the other two branches of government.  The actions of President Tandja and other past African presidents have compromised the principle of independence in government that is so vital to a functioning and efficient democracy.  The principle of independence is present in governmental affairs when an institution can check the powers and actions of other institutions without penalty, and vice versa.  This can only be possible if the institutions, such as the judiciary or constitutional council, are comprised of officials who are well-qualified and have gone through an extensive confirmation and examination process in which they have professed and made evident their independence from those who appointed them. 

The IIJD calls on President Tandja to restore the Constitutional Court and National Assembly so that stability can be established.  Moreover, the Constitution of Niger, as well as the constitutions of the other countries mentioned, must be redrafted to limit the executive’s power and dominance over the other branches of government.  Such limits must include the removal of the executive’s ability to dissolve the legislative body, and the implementation of an extensive confirmation process that includes a legislative inquiry of nominees.  As President Obama said in Ghana: “history is…not with those who use coups or change Constitutions to stay in power.  Africa doesn’t need strongmen, it needs strong institutions.”  Strong institutions will only persist when the principle of independence in governmental affairs is adhered to by all. 

 
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  1. < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8069650.stm>

    Ibid.

    < http://www.tamtaminfo.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1372:declaration-du-bureau-politique-cds-rahama-sur-le-schema-l-tazartche-r-propose-au-president-de-la-republique&catid=44:politique&Itemid=61>

    < http://allafrica.com/stories/200907160102.html>

    < http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jJqZqCOmhiBm7XKvnTzefuzqvNMQ>

    < http://static.rnw.nl/migratie/www.radionetherlands.nl/currentaffairs/region/africa/080326-cameroon-violence-mc-redirected>

    <http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=17065>

    Ibid.

    < http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=475&year=2009>

 
 
   
 
 
 
   
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