Earlier this month, both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives held committee hearings to discuss the future of U.S. relations with Africa. The hearings largely addressed the Department of Defense (DoD), which had recently proposed sweeping changes that would accord greater attention to Africa by establishing a unified U.S. Africa Command, also known as AFRICOM, to oversee all operations of the DoD, the State Department, and USAID [1]. Proponents of the changes argue that AFRICOM would acknowledge the increasing strategic importance of Africa to international security and would enhance the efficiency and harmony of U.S. military, diplomatic, and humanitarian operations on the continent. However, the proposal has been met with controversy and open hostility in Africa: media coverage of AFRICOM has been almost universally negative, and many heads of state have refused to host an AFRICOM staff headquarters. Despite the controversy, most Americans remain unaware of the proposed changes to U.S.-African relations, let alone their implications to the African people.

Currently, responsibility for DoD operations in Africa is divided between three commands, each of which treats African affairs as a secondary responsibility to operations in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. This structure reflects antiquated Cold War foreign policy priorities, in which developing countries were pawns in the larger struggle for power between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Diplomatic operations, under the State Department, and humanitarian operations, under USAID, are completely autonomous from DoD operations [2].

The structure of AFRICOM, however, would reflect the centrality of the “war on terror” to twenty-first century foreign policy, particularly the belief that failed states are breeding grounds for terrorist organizations and radical regimes. Thus, in the interest of preventing such conditions from arising, the DoD believes that African economic development and political stability are integral to international security—a belief that the IIJD shares. To that end, the DoD views the integration of State Department and USAID operations into AFRICOM along with the DoD as logical, since all three seek to promote international security. AFRICOM will thus be spearheaded by a four-star general, William E. Ward, who will collaborate with a civilian official from the State Department to ensure that AFRICOM reflects the diverse policy goals of its military and diplomatic operatives [3].

If the DoD’s plans succeed, AFRICOM will be launched in September 2008. Its staff will work closely with their African counterparts to train local troops in stability and anti-terrorism measures. Additionally, AFRICOM’s humanitarian arm will preclude future crises, such as the genocide in Darfur and the AIDS pandemic, and it will promote African integration into the global economy.* All of these operations will comply with the African Union’s regional security strategy, which supports African multilateralism and shuns unilateral foreign intervention in African affairs [4].

Yet critics argue that AFRICOM’s goals are unattainable, and that its mere existence violates the African Union’s commitment to African sovereignty. They believe that a major component of the “war on terror” is unrivaled American control of energy sources, particularly oil. This idea is particularly troublesome in light of the fact that most of Africa’s oil deposits lie in politically volatile countries, such as Somalia. In these cases, “stabilization” would entail propping up corrupt, totalitarian regimes and excluding the vast majority of the population.** Further, critics claim that AFRICOM would be an extension of, rather than a departure from, U.S. Cold War policy: it would seek to counter the growing influence of China in African affairs, thereby exploiting developing countries in its struggle against an emerging rival.

Third, critics argue that combining military, diplomatic, and humanitarian operations reveals the DoD’s efforts to exert control over African civilians by Westernizing African culture. This amounts to cultural imperialism, which negates the value of African culture and makes the continent a target for Islamic extremists because of its ties to the U.S. Finally, critics contend that humanitarian aid is simply a predecessor for more direct military intervention in Africa, and that the DoD’s authority over AFRICOM makes USAID’s operations even more suspect. To support their claims, the critics point to European missionaries’ role in opening Africa to nineteenth-century colonizers, as well as the U.S.’s history of supporting oppressive regimes, for example the Taliban in Afghanistan and Mobutu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in order to promote its own interests. With these concerns in mind, the African press and most governments have ardently denounced AFRICOM. Without significant African support, AFRICOM’s stated goal of working closely with local governments and people seems unrealistic [5].

The IIJD recognizes that the African suspicion of an organized, unilateral foreign presence on the continent is consistent with African Union policy and understandable based on colonial history. Further, the African fear of American neo-imperialism will prove justified if the U.S. uses AFRICOM to prop up corrupt regimes, such as that of Somalia, in the name of stability. If USAID efforts are completely absorbed into AFRICOM, aid workers will be associated with the U.S. military in the minds of the community members they purport to help, and the result could prove devastating to the efforts of USAID and other U.S. development organizations. Ultimately, U.S. foreign policy must be a collaborative effort with Africans; thus, AFRICOM must not be implemented without the consent of the people it claims to serve. Moreover, if it truly values economic development and political stability, AFRICOM should empower people through financing civil society, democratic institutions, and judicial reform initiatives. To do otherwise would violate the IIJD’s principle of grassroots, democratic reform and would only engender resentment from the people it claims to help.

* Defenders of AFRICOM state their goal of integrating Africa into the global economy, yet it is unclear how exactly this will happen.  It is generally assumed that contact with the U.S. (particularly through humanitarian aid) will translate to interest in, and access to, new markets.  However, there is no clear, tangible plan to make this happen.

** The IIJD’s stance on the situation in Somalia is available online at: http://iijd.org/051807Somalia.html