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Sudan May Soon Open Borders to UN Forces

By Yael Wexler

June 22, 2007

After much struggle, the government at Khartoum accepted a revised UN proposal for the deployment of a twenty-thousand-strong international force to mitigate what some observers have called the genocide in the western Sudanese province of Darfur. This is arguably the most open and conciliatory move that Sudanese President Umar al-Bashir’s government has exhibited toward the demands of other nations for legal, political and humanitarian recourse. However, on further investigation, it appears that this agreement is no conciliation at all. President al-Bashir maintains that any international presence in Darfur should come only from other African nations. This is an unlikely task for the already depleted African Union, whose fledgling force of three thousand troops has yet to prove to be very effectual in quelling violence or ensuring personal security in the refugee camps of two hundred thousand victims [1, 2].

Although multiple causes have sustained it, the conflict in Darfur began four years ago when western Sudanese ethnic groups rose up in small militias against the national government that systemically excluded them from judicial and parliamentary participation. A militia, the ‘janjaweed’, was then galvanized in response to the insurrection. The ‘janjaweed’ was made more prominent and robust in strength as a result of the direct support from the Sudanese army and government [3]. Support from Khartoum gives the ‘janjaweed’ the advantage in their guerilla-style warfare against the land-tilling ethnicities of western Sudan that once defended themselves against their civil subjugation [4]. The conflict has left an estimated 2.5 million Sudanese either internally displaced or living as refugees in the neighboring Chad. At least 200,000 have been murdered.

Despite the gravity of the situation, the UN should not celebrate the June 12th agreement as a success. Up until this point, progress has been undermined by Sudan’s lack of commitment to the peace process, exhibited in three ways: first, by Sudan’s history of backtracking on agreements; second, by the double-voicing occurring between President al-Bashir and his ministers [5], each of whom deliver opposing statements of fidelity to the agreements; and third, by its continued oil trade agreements with China, the profits of which largely funds the ‘janjaweed’ militia (China receives 71.1 % of Sudanese exports [6]).   

The role of external players in this conflict is great and they may in fact be the final arbiters of the situation inside Sudan. Their importance in the conflict indicates a grave failing on the part of Khartoum to secure and govern its own territory and people. The fate of Darfur may hang in the diplomatic capabilities of two international parties at this point in time: either China’s money will see the continuity of the ‘janjaweed’s’ genocidal campaign or France’s renewed diplomatic might under President Sarkozy and other key players will see the end of the conflict at all international costs. In fact, Richard Goldstone, South African international war crimes prosecutor, suggests curbing influence of the Chinese petrodollars in Darfur by creating an internationally monitored trust fund wherein all Sudanese oil revenues be saved and later be distributed to Darfur victims. Accordingly, China would still get its oil, and Sudan would still be paid the fair market value for its oil [7].

The pressure on President al-Bashir to comply with international demands has increased primarily due to the commitment of the new French President Nicolas Sarkozy. One of Sarkozy’s recent campaign promises was to the people of Darfur. In addition, French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner was active at the Addis Ababa negotiations. In a further attempt to strengthen the diplomatic efforts on Darfur, France will host an international conference dedicated to the conflict wherein European nations, and other key nations (including China, US, and Egypt), will meet to decide on issues of safe passage for humanitarian aid to the region, as well as decide on diplomatic positions and strategies for finally ending this protracted conflict.

During a meeting of Arab states in Cairo, Sudan’s neighbor Chad agreed to open its border with Darfur to allow access for humanitarian convoys to the refugee camps. Chadian President Idriss Deby expressed his sorrow that an international deployment is a necessary supplement to apparently weak African governments’ efforts at helping themselves or each other through the African Union. He said: “Chad is a poor country, and it cannot stand up to the pressures by the world’s major powers and the United Nations. In the past, we refused the international troops, but now the situation does not allow for that, and if there will be further deterioration, we won’t be able to resist” [8].

The conflict in Darfur was caused and has been prolonged by systemic weakness in the Sudanese government. Khartoum lacks many qualities of an effective justice system, such as transparency, accountability and legitimacy. As the constitution outlines, the executive branch controls the judicial and legislative branches of the government [9]. Discriminatory policies are practiced that enfranchise some ethnicities at others’ expense. The absence of the separation of powers in the government, and the practice of discrimination and persecution, are two intolerable aspects of the Sudan that fuel the conflict in Darfur. The underlying causes of the crisis are not only found in the poor leadership exhibited but also in the weak institutions upon which these leaders base their work.

The IIJD supports the decision to deploy UN troops to stabilize the region. Short-term international support can be beneficial to alleviating the negative effects of war, genocide, and civil and human rights abuses. This external force, however, should not be considered a panacea to Sudanese problems. The opposite is in fact the case: mechanisms for empowering the civil service, reforming corrupt institutions and policies of the executive monopoly of power, as well as dismantling systemic barriers to justice, are the ultimate goals IIJD sees for Sudanese recovery. Strong, reliable, and accountable institutions prevent impunity and human rights abuses, while offering sustained improvement. International efforts – diplomatic and military – can create fertile ground for such systemic reorganization and development.