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A prominent belief amongst African leaders today is that the international community will accept your rule as democratic if you hold perceptibly legitimate elections of which you are declared victor. Although elections are arguably the first step to a more representative form of government, one that serves the will of its people, democracy of course is not achieved solely through the organization of elections. Democracy requires the development of a government that protects the human and civil rights of its people and that is guided by a strong system of laws to which no one is exempt. Perhaps even more important, democracy cannot flourish without a deep understanding and acceptance by the general population, as well as by those who seek to lead, of the values it represents. Sudan’s recent presidential and parliamentary elections in April, the country’s first multi-party elections in almost 25 years, demonstrated that the country is moving towards a more democratic political system. However, widespread election fraud, intimidation and harassment of voters by major political parties in the north and the south signify the refusal of the most powerful to accept the possibility of defeat and subsequently to adopt a truly democratic system of governance.

With the referendum on Southern independence fast approaching, the pressure on Bashir’s government and opposition political parties to hold elections—and subsequently fulfill one of their chief obligations under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005—was immense. It was partly this pressure by the international community to hold elections without delay that undermined their very legitimacy. The push to hold elections resulted in extreme disorganization and confusion, unchecked repression of the opposition, prevalent fraud and a serious lack of inclusiveness. Calls for delay by independent monitoring groups were met with staunch opposition, and not surprisingly, a threat from President Bashir, who vowed to ‘cut off [the monitors’] fingers’ before throwing them out of the country. Rather ironically, because the elections were so wrought with fraud, the international community had no choice but to admit, that even with a two-day extension, the elections had failed to meet international standards.

As it is always the case in Africa prior to elections, reports of election fraud and repression by the Sudanese government began months prior to the elections, during the voter registration period in 2009. A lack of information regarding registration times and locations, ongoing violence in Southern Sudan, the failure to reach millions already displaced in Darfur, and delays in accrediting international election observers, all served as obstacles to ensuring proper voter registration. There were even reports that National Election Commission (NEC) officials had used the same boundary tape used to indicate the presence of landmines to identify registration centers, which caused, to say the least, significant confusion. Although voter registration had its setbacks, the NEC did manage to register over 15 million people, which comprises about 75 percent of the country’s voting age population. This was considered a huge milestone for the country and a significant first step in implementing the CPA, which outlines the requirements for establishing the referendum on Southern independence.

During late 2009, in an attempt to build greater understanding of democratic processes and civil rights, political parties and civic activists began educating and training local populations on the election process. However, security forces were quick to disrupt many of these public meetings. In November and December, it was reported that the government either cancelled, denied permission for or disbanded several election monitoring training sessions in Kassala (eastern Sudan), two public meetings in Kosti, a public speech in support of an independent presidential candidate in Khartoum and dozens of public rallies. With a population that has little to no understanding of democracy or even the simple act of voting, the need for civic education is great. Illiteracy in the South is rampant; much of the population has never even held a pencil, which demonstrates how much of a challenge it is to train the population in the electoral process. The ballot alone had over 12 different parties vying for state, national and sub-national legislative and executive positions as well as the presidency; navigating the form proved confounding for even the most educated of Sudanese. Although assistance was provided to illiterate voters during the actual elections, such minimal support cannot replace the necessity for civic education, which was so often denied by the government in the months leading up to the election. In some instances, the lack of understanding of democratic processes by the local population, coupled with strong feelings of ethnocentrism and tribalism, led to violence. For example, in November, Samson Kawje, Minister of Agriculture for Southern Sudan, while promoting voter registration in the small administrative area of Wondoruba payam, was shot by an armed community member, who was angry over Kawja’s attempt to place the town under the jurisdiction of a neighboring county. This example also demonstrates how the failure to accept compromise and the continued use of violence in response to political change remains a significant obstacle to achieving real democratic reform in Sudan.

In the run up to the elections, campaigning also proved difficult for opposition and independent party candidates. There were hundreds of reports of opposition candidates being harassed, intimidated, arrested or otherwise detained ahead of the presidential and parliamentary elections. In Western Bahr el-Ghazal, security forces arrested 14 members of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), then interrogated and beat them. Another 22 were detained by government forces, beaten and then forced to sign an agreement, promising to discontinue all political activities. Southern security forces also targeted NCP members active in the South, as well as any Southern political parties that threatened SPLM’s dominance at the polls. In addition to the repressive tactics employed by both the NCP and the SPLM, Bashir and the NCP possessed an unfair advantage, as they improperly utilized government resources to support their electoral campaign. There were even accusations that the NCP had used UNAMID helicopters to move party members around to campaign. Furthermore, The NCP’s influence over national and local media was unmatched. Although state-owned media had allocated free air time to all parties’ candidates, television and radio campaign coverage in Khartoum primarily focused upon the NCP. In addition, the government continued to obstruct press freedom throughout the country. In March, security forces stormed the offices of Bakhita FM, a community-based radio station run by a Catholic Church and threatened to shut the station down unless it stopped broadcasting political programming. That same month, the privately-owned Liberty FM was raided after broadcasting an interview with an independent politician and also threatened with closure if it continued to broadcast political programming.

Every aspect of Sudan’s election process was wrought with fraud, from the 2008 census (after which the government gerrymandered to favor the NCP) to voter registration, (during which NCP members were arrested on accusations of paying people to register as NCP), and to the actual elections, (during which thousands of SPLA soldiers were reportedly flown around the South to vote, ensuring that SPLM remained the dominant party in each state). Opposition parties were clearly at a disadvantage throughout the election process, and as a result, several parties pulled out of the presidential, parliamentary and governorship races, demanding the government ensure more balanced campaign and media access. Confusion then reigned over partial and full election boycotts announced by the SPLM, the Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). The Umma Party’s pull-out perhaps had the largest impact on the elections and their credibility; the Umma Party, which is widely popular, had won the 1986 elections before being ousted by a coup led by current President Bashir in 1989. Opposition parties’ concerns regarding government and NCP fraud were certainly valid. In an environment in which they could not freely campaign or rally supporters, the opposition argued it had little chance of properly contesting the ruling NCP and Bashir, who is vehemently seeking validation in view of being charged with war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC). However, the SPLM, and other opposition parties, were also divided in their strategy, questioning whether efforts should be more focused on consolidating the South in preparation of the referendum, or on taking on Bashir and gaining more power in the North. In the end, a coalition of the major opposition parties chose to pull out of both the presidential and legislative races (their names remained on the ballots however due to the short notice), certain that without their participation, the elections and any outcome would be considered illegitimate. The SPLM pulled out of only the presidential race, however. It could not risk jeopardizing its obvious advantage in the South.

The current situation in Sudan leads many to question whether elections can be held in an environment so lacking in basic democratic principles. With the country currently run by a dictator who refuses to cede even the slightest bit of power and who is wanted for the most horrific of war crimes, the expectation of free and fair elections is naïve at best. The results of the election have favored Bashir and the NCP, but it is unlikely Bashir will achieve the legitimacy he so ironically fought so illegitimately for. And what of the opposition? The SPLM, which was so preoccupied with retaining its power, certainly shares in the blame for the failure of the elections. It too employed repressive and fraudulent means to ensure victory, but against such a powerful and unscrupulous adversary, one could argue the SPLM had little to no choice to revert to such means. However, what is troubling is that the SPLM’s behavior during this election is likely indicative of how it will act in any future campaigns.

With widespread repression, fraud and logistical problems reported throughout the electoral process, and the outcome already decided, the results of the election are unlikely to have any impact upon Sudan’s political dynamic. It has been argued that the elections, at best, served as a practice run for the upcoming referendum, but this is a somewhat trivial view of an exercise whose implementation and legitimacy are so crucial to facilitating democracy. If the elections were indeed a test, particularly of the Sudanese’s ability to understand, accept and practice democracy, the Sudanese and the international community have largely failed in achieving this task. Therefore, the International Institute for Justice and Development (IIJD) cannot recognize Sudan’s elections as legitimate. The IIJD maintains strongly that elections must be free and fair in order for their results to be deemed valid. In the case of Sudan, it was apparent from the beginning that the volatility of the political environment would make achieving such a goal nearly impossible. Furthermore, although international election monitors were operating in a very restrictive environment, their assistance in facilitating the elections was largely superficial. International assistance was mostly limited to training local monitors in proper voting procedures and assisting in preparing ballots. The IIJD strongly believes this type of electoral assistance to be wholly inadequate and further maintains that the only way to ensure free and fair elections in a country such as Sudan is to involve the international community and independent international NGOs in from the very beginning of the electoral process.

In approximately one month, the mandate of the United Nations’ peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) will expire, a frightening reality considering the state of the country, which continues to suffer from ongoing conflict, substantial population displacement and widespread corruption. In December 2009, the United Nations Security Council, in compliance with a formal request from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) government, voted in favour of extending MONUC’s mandate for only another five months. In September, the DRC government had announced its demand for the complete withdrawal of MONUC peacekeeping forces by 2011.

Many found the DRC’s request surprising given the country’s lack of sufficient progress in security sector reform. Despite recent successes in defeating rebel forces in the Kivus, most would argue that the DRC’s security forces—whose reputation is marred by serious allegations of murder and rape of civilians — are, to say the least, ill-equipped to provide security for populations living throughout an area the size of Western Europe. The DRC’s demand for MONUC’s withdrawal is decidedly premature, if not dangerous, as MONUC’s removal is certain to shrink humanitarian space. Furthermore, because the DRC’s current capacity to provide security for its population is so lacking, the demand for withdrawal places the Security Council in a precarious position, as it must decide whether state sovereignty in this particular instance supersedes its responsibility to protect.

The United Nations Mission in DRC, or MONUC, was first implemented in 1999, to enforce a ceasefire finally achieved after years of conflict involving several countries of the region, often referred to as Africa’s World War. MONUC’s mandate is quite comprehensive in nature and has oftentimes had to adapt to changing circumstances due to ongoing conflict in Eastern DRC. MONUC is also the largest of the UN’s peacekeeping operations with over 20,000 troops from 50 countries. Although some MONUC troops have been implicated in cases of sexual abuse and illegal arms trade, the majority of troops have served commendably, and the UN’s mission in DRC has been praised as largely successful. Perhaps its greatest achievement was to help organize and monitor the DRC’s first democratic presidential, national and provincial elections (2006) in over 40 years. Since its establishment, MONUC has also successfully monitored ceasefires between the DRC and foreign governments, disarmed and repatriated thousands of combatants, provided substantial assistance in building democratic governmental institutions and assisted the government more recently in defeating and disarming a significant number of remaining armed groups in the Kivus and Ituri regions.

Before MONUC can be withdrawn, there are several critical preconditions set out by the Security Council that must be met by the DRC government. These include that all Congolese and foreign combatant groups be disarmed and demobilized, or repatriated, and that the Congolese Armed Forces, the FARDC, and the Congolese National Police have the capacity to assume responsibility for the country’s security. Specifically with regard to the establishment of a stable security environment, progress must be measured by the achievement of stabilization of sensitive areas, particularly in the eastern DRC; the completion of the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants and repatriation of foreign armed groups (the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and Interhamwe); the proper training of national security forces and the extension of State authority throughout the territory. In addition to security sector reform, the Security Council is explicit in requiring that the DRC reform its democratic institutions to include the adoption of essential legislation, relating to FARDC reform and the establishment of essential State institutions at the national, provincial and local levels.

Thus far, the DRC government has made progress with regards to the development of national institutions as well as with conducting fair elections; however, security challenges throughout the eastern DRC have impeded proper implementation of institutional reform throughout the country and have led to a major humanitarian crisis, with hundreds of thousands of civilians displaced. Most troubling is the ongoing violence against civilians by all parties of the conflict, particularly in the Kivus. This past year, the DRC government, with the somewhat controversial support of MONUC troops and the unprecedented assistance of Rwandan and Ugandan forces, launched a military campaign against rebel militias operating in eastern DRC and along the border areas. The campaign was mostly successful, as General Laurent Nkunda was arrested, and the majority of his militia was either killed or forced to surrender after fierce fighting for which the combatants were ill-prepared. In addition, the FARDC managed to repulse FDLR and LRA forces from several towns, restoring security in those areas. According to the UN, since the beginning of 2009, over 1,400 FDLR militants have surrendered, three times more than in previous years, and the objective of disrupting and dispersing FDLR forces in order to weaken their control of population centers and their capacity to exploit the country’s wealth was largely achieved.

However, even with the campaign’s recent successes, the rebel threat remains, as there are approximately 5,000 FDLR/Hutu rebels, as well as a significant number of LRA militants, still operating deep within the Eastern DRC. The task at hand for the FARDC is to maintain control of areas retaken from the rebels and continue an aggressive campaign that incorporates military pressure with incentives for disarmament. Although DRC government and military officials are confident in the FARDC’s ability to accomplish such goals, none can deny that its capacity to implement this final campaign is boosted by MONUC’s presence. In fact, the shifting of a significant number of MONUC’s troops to the Kivus as well as MONUC’s logistical support remains key to the FARDC’s continued success in defeating the rebels. If MONUC was to withdraw at this time, FARDC would lose its strategic advantage. In addition, its capacity to simultaneously maintain security in the Western and Southern parts of the country as well as in the Eastern DRC would be greatly diminished, leaving security forces spread too thinly and populations more susceptible to violence.

In addition to the obvious strategic and logistical problems resulting from a possible MONUC withdrawal, are the potential humanitarian consequences. There are serious concerns over the FARDC’s capability to protect civilian populations, as a number of its troops have been implicated in atrocious human rights violations. Human rights groups reported that during the military’s 2009 campaign, Congolese army soldiers, as well as FDLR militants, attacked civilians, accusing them of being collaborators. Some were attacked with machetes and others were shot while trying to flee. Homes were looted and then burnt, with families forced to remain inside. Witnesses reported that four civilians had been shot by FARDC soldiers who fired indiscriminately, while looting the area. There are also reports of FARDC soldiers engaging in illegal mining activities in the Kivus and extorting money from civilians through the imposition of illegal ‘taxes’. In fact, some civilians, fleeing from the violence, were forced to pay fines before being allowed to pass army checkpoints. There were additional reports of soldiers hijacking trucks delivering humanitarian aid, diverting it for military purposes. Perhaps most disturbing is the increase in sexual violence since 2008. Human Rights Watch reported that within the first nine months of 2009, there were 7,500 cases of sexual violence against women and girls in the Kivus. Most of the women were gang-raped and later died as a result of their injuries. In addition, many women were held as sex slaves, both by the FDLR and Congolese soldiers; some of these women were mutilated and then killed by machete or shot in the vagina. Cases of rape and other forms of sexual violence have not been restricted to poorly trained and lowly ranked soldiers and officers; senior military officers have also been implicated in cases of rape and murder.

As reports of FARDC’s human rights violations surfaced in 2009, criticism of MONUC’s support of military operations in the Kivus intensified. MONUC acknowledged the difficulties of executing a mandate that requires it to both protect civilians and assist an undisciplined army, and it took steps to limit its support of suspected human rights violators. For instance, MONUC made it clear to DRC government officials that it would not provide support to units commanded by Colonel Zimulinda and Bosco Ntanganda, who are both accused of serious human rights abuses. In addition, MONUC continues to provide training to Congolese army units in human rights and international humanitarian law. And although MONUC’s support of the Congolese army was criticized as undermining the mission’s primary objective, the protection of civilians, MONUC peacekeepers have been praised overall for their efforts while operating under very complex circumstances. Furthermore, MONUC’s presence in the Kivus certainly acted as part deterrent against those seeking to commit further crimes against civilians, as its peacekeepers deployed throughout the Kivus served, not only as logistical support, but as observers. Amidst continued allegations of abuse, MONUC command also recently deployed military police to several battalions with the objective of preventing and punishing acts of human rights violations. In addition, sensitization programs are ongoing for military leaders and troops on the issues of discipline, moral duty and the military hierarchy’s responsibilities.

Despite these reform initiatives, it is questionable whether further training can alleviate the proclivity of some DRC soldiers to commit heinous acts of violence. Many troops had already undergone rigorous training prior to the army’s recent campaign, but still abused their position regardless, perpetrating the most inhumane of acts. Furthermore, although thousands of soldiers have been imprisoned thus far for various crimes, a significant number of the soldiers suspected of human rights violations are still active members of the military, including senior officers. Hence, with an increasing number of displaced returning to Eastern DRC and civilians still subject to violence from all sides, MONUC’s removal is certain to have dangerous consequences, which makes the timing of the DRC’s request for MONUC’s withdrawal quite reckless and subsequently, rather confounding. The DRC government has yet to provide adequate explanation for the timing of its decision, which leads many to question its intentions. Some have speculated that the government’s demand for MONUC’s withdrawal is an attempt to convey its competency to its people in anticipation of the upcoming 2011 presidential and legislative elections. MONUC’s withdrawal also ensures greater control by the DRC government over the elections, which is worrying, given allegations that the military had forced civilians fleeing the violence to surrender their electoral cards. Without MONUC oversight, it is likely that ethnic-based fear and intimidation tactics will be employed during election time, particularly against opposition supporters, and at a much greater level than seen during the 2006 elections.

In May 2010, the UN Security Council will once again extend MONUC’s mandate, but for how long, remains to be seen. Its decision will certainly be influenced by political and legal considerations, particularly those that relate to state sovereignty. MONUC, like every other UN peacekeeping mission, operates with the consent of the government. Therefore, the DRC’s demand for MONUC’s removal, which is an exercise of state sovereignty, should be respected. However, as stated above, a premature withdrawal could have very serious consequences for the population. With MONUC’s mandate not yet fulfilled and the DRC’s security sector still requiring major reform, it seems that by requesting MONUC’s withdrawal, the DRC government is sacrificing the security of its population to achieve political ends. Recognizing such, the Security Council could extend MONUC’s mandate against the wishes of the DRC government, under the principle of the responsibility to protect. The principle of the responsibility to protect, or R2P, is based on the notion that sovereignty is not a privilege, but a responsibility, so when a government fails to protect the human rights of its people, the international community then has the responsibility of intervening on the people’s behalf. The R2P was first proposed in a report commissioned by the Canadian government in 2001, but did not gain formal recognition by the international community until the 2005 World Summit. The R2P was outlined in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit’s outcome document and has since been accepted in principle by much of the international community, as well as regional organizations. For instance, the African Union’s (AU) founding charter is explicit in its adoption of the principle, vowing to intervene when any member state of the AU fails to act in the event of grave circumstances (war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity). Over the years, the R2P has become a widely accepted norm and can be exercised by the Security Council in the event that a state commits, or refuses to prevent, mass atrocities against its people. The Security Council, therefore, does have legitimate justification for denying the DRC government’s request. It could extend MONUC’s mandate, citing R2P. However, extending MONUC’s mandate against the will of the government could cause major resentment and hence, result in the loss of the DRC’s cooperation, which will make it difficult for MONUC troops to function. It is therefore imperative that the responsibility to protect only be enacted as a last resort. In addition, it would be difficult to argue that MONUC’s withdrawal would definitely result in mass atrocities; R2P’s enactment would be highly predictive at this point. However, the Security Council would certainly have cause to implement the principle if after MONUC’s withdrawal, violence increased significantly and the DRC government either failed or was unable to sufficiently respond.

In conclusion, at the International Institute for Justice and Development we say that:

1. Four million (4,000 000) plus people killed in the DRC’s war alone is enough! Everyone of must take their responsibilities. The safety and security of the DRC people should be of the utmost priority. Although progress has been made in the security sector, full DDR of combatants has not been achieved and as a result, a significant portion of the DRC population remains vulnerable to violence, not only by rebel forces but by government forces as well.
2. In addition to a lack of basic security, MONUC and the DRC government have yet to fulfill their mandate to establish widespread and sustainable democratic reform. In particular, the DRC is yet to establish a system of governance that guarantees separation of power between the legislative, judicial and executive branches. Institution reforms to establish an independent justice system, which is central to ensuring proper separation of powers, government accountability and transparency, are yet to be completed. Only through the reform of these systems can we combat corruption, demand accountability, protect human and civil rights abuses, secure investments, and create an incentive for educated and capable citizens to stay or come back to contribute to their DRC’s futures.
3. The International Institute for Justice and Development (IIJD) calls upon the DRC government to rescind its request for MONUC’s withdrawal. It also calls upon the UN Security Council, the AU and the greater international community to place pressure upon the DRC government to accept a mandate that realistically reflects and addresses the circumstances on the ground, not the political needs of the current government. Based on the R2P, the UN Security Council should extend the mandate of the MONUC at least until the next elections of 2011.
4. With the upcoming 2011 elections in the DRC, the IIJD cannot emphasize enough the importance of providing a safe and secure environment so that free and fair elections may take place. The IIJD believes that the DRC government currently lacks the capacity to provide sufficient security to guarantee free and fair elections.
5. Most importantly, the IIJD insists that if the DRC government under the leadership of President Joseph Kabila, refuses an extension of MONUC’s mandate, then it must accept full responsibility for any atrocities that may result and understand that it, meaning any or all of its members as well as its security forces, will be held accountable by the international community through the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Last August 2009, The International Institute for Justice and Development (IIJD), Inc. contacted your office requesting that you take a stronger stance against the dictatorial and illegal actions committed by President Tandja to systematically dismantling Niger’s democratic institutions. We are once more calling upon the United States government and the International community to help restore and strengthen democracy in Niger. The current situation began on February 18, 2010, when a faction of Niger’s military calling themselves the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy (CSRD), staged a military coup, deposing Niger’s controversial president, and fledgling dictator, Mamadou Tandja, with the promise to restore the country’s recently dismantled democratic institutions.  

Although many are quick to criticize the CSRD’s actions, no one can deny that it was recent actions taken by Tandja that had essentially destroyed the democratic character and the institutional foundation of Niger’s government. In fact, Tandja’s actions over the course of the last several months amounted to nothing less than a coup d’état, as every one of Niger’s democratic institutions was illegitimately dissolved and the country’s constitution rewritten to allow Tandja to stay in power, perhaps indefinitely. Tandja’s short-lived dictatorship began in mid-2009 with his call to hold a referendum to adopt a new constitution, one which contained no presidential term limits. After the Constitutional Court of Niger ruled three times that any such referendum would be unconstitutional, Tandja simply dissolved the Court by way of presidential decree. Under the constitution, the dissolution of the Court is strictly prohibited by anyone, including the president, and judges cannot be removed until the end of their six-year term, which would have been in 2012. Article 36 of the 1999 Niger constitution specifically mandates that a president, elected for five-year terms, is eligible for only one re-election. Article 136 further specifies that “articles 36 and 141…of the present constitution cannot be subject to an amendment.” 

The Court was not the sole government body to fall victim to Tandja’s power grab. After the Court’s first ruling, Tandja once again invoked his executive powers and without any legal justification, dissolved The National Assembly, Niger’s parliament. With increasing parliamentary opposition to his referendum plan, Tandja ran the risk of being charged and tried for treason by the Assembly, through a specially formed ‘High Court’.  By June of 2009, Tandja had effectively dismantled both the judicial and legislative branches of government. In August, however, Tandja proceeded with the referendum, amidst the protest of hundreds of thousands and without the participation of opposition parties, which had staged a boycott. A new constitution was passed, one that provided Tandja with sweeping new powers, including the power to appoint one-third of the parliament’s members and to establish a media oversight body with the authority to jail journalists deemed a threat to national security. Term limits were also completely abolished, veritably securing Tandja’s path to dictatorship.  

Shortly before the referendum, the private radio station, ‘Dounia’ was shut down by Tandja’s government, after reportedly calling upon military forces to stop obeying Tandja. Soon afterwards, the military issued a statement declaring the army’s continued neutrality during the country’s political impasse. Interestingly, calls for the military to intervene stemmed not only from private entities, but from civil society organizations and opposition leaders, some of which were arrested as a result. The military gained the public’s trust in 1999 when its intervention played a key role in establishing the country’s first democratic government. The military’s refusal to intervene on the grounds of neutrality was at first questionable. Tandja himself had been a senior military officer, whose rise to power was largely the result of the 1999 military coup, leading most to conclude that his connection to the military, as well as its loyalty to him, was still arguably strong. Hence, the military’s initial complacence in the matter could certainly have been interpreted as tacit support. However, its refusal to intervene was also interpreted by many as an exercise in idealistic restraint. Although it had ample opportunity over the past year, the military did not act opportunistically, but instead chose to test the tenacity of the country’s civil institutions.   

On February 18, 2010, the military finally intervened. Although immediately condemned by much of the international community, the actions of the CSRD were quickly praised by a significant majority of Niger’s public as well as the Coordination of Democratic Forces for the Republic (CFDR), a group comprised of opposition political parties, labor organizations and human rights groups, formed last year to protest and challenge Tandja’s plans for referendum. While it is difficult to ascertain CSRD’s true motives at this point, there is good reason for cautious optimism regarding its intentions. First, the junta’s actions are an obvious response to the destruction of the state’s democratic institutions and the resulting civil strife.  Also relevant is the make-up of the junta, some of which were participants in the 1999 coup, so, in deposing Tandja, the junta actually acted against a former ally. In addition, the fact that they were members of the 1999 coup, which first led to the establishment of democratic order in the country, bodes well for their stated intention to restore democracy.

In the past weeks, the junta has taken some steps to reassure the public, as well as the international community, of its intentions. It has appointed an interim prime minister, a civilian, former Information Minister Mahamadou Danda. In addition, state institutions are now functioning, and most government ministers have returned to work, and business in the capital, as well as the rest of the country is proceeding without disruption. Furthermore, on February 26, the CSRD announced that no member of the junta, or the interim government that is currently being set up, will be permitted to run in the upcoming elections. 

In order for Niger to return to legitimate, democratic rule, constitutional order must be re-established. Therefore, the IIJD calls upon the CSRD and the interim government to immediately restore the 1999 constitution. The constitution imposed upon the country by Tandja in 2009 cannot be recognized as legitimate in any form, since its creation was the result of an unrepresentative and inherently flawed referendum. In addition to reestablishing the country’s 1999 constitution, an independent assessment of executive powers under the constitution should be immediately conducted to ensure proper separation of powers. This includes applying stricter language regarding the president’s power to rule by executive decree.  The IIJD specifically believes that the constitution should explicitly prohibit the president from using executive decree to dissolve the country’s Supreme Court, constitutional court and the National Assembly. Under no circumstances, should the president be permitted to dissolve either body. Furthermore, IIJD also calls upon the CSRD to immediately reinstate the National Assembly and constitutional court in its full form, prior to their dissolution by Tandja in 2009.   We also call upon the International Community to use this opportunity to apply pressure for a stronger separation of power between the branches of government, and especially strengthening the justice system of Niger and guaranteeing its independence.

Although Tandja acted illegally in rewriting the constitution, making the extension of his rule illegitimate, the junta too lacks any real legality in its rule.  Therefore, it must schedule presidential elections within a reasonable timeframe. The elections must be free, fair and transparent and organized by an independent electoral body. Given Niger’s success with holding legitimate elections over the past ten years, this should not be an issue; however, the importance of transparency, particularly after a military coup, can never be overstated. Hence, the IIJD strongly urges the CSRD and the interim government to include the international community, specifically the UN, in both restoring constitutional order and organizing and monitoring any upcoming elections. The IIJD also calls upon the international community to do its part in continuing to place pressure upon the interim regime to immediately restore constitutional order and Niger’s democratic institutions. In order to build a solid foundation for Niger, it essential that institutions reform be launched immediately to reinforce the separation of power between branches of government and to establish a strong independent and well functioning justice system even before presidential elections.

By guaranteeing free and fair elections, and ensuring that results are justifiable and recognized by all, the junta will have fulfilled its promise to its people, and to itself, to restore Niger’s democracy, thereby providing its country with hope for a more successful future; one that benefits the ambitions of all.

The IIJD strongly believes that the United States, along with the rest of international community, must do everything in its power to ensure the restoration of democracy and reinstatement of the 1999 constitution, the dissolved National Assembly, and the constitutional court. Without action, Niger is heading back towards the instable military and autocratic regime that plagued its people in past decades.

With Niger’s hard-won, yet still vulnerable democracy poised for possible destruction, the IIJD urges you, in line with the spirit of your speech in Ghana, to take firmer action to ensure that the 1999 constitutional order is restored and improved.

With my highest esteem and sincere considerations,

Benjamin Ngachoko

President & C.E.O.

International Institute for Justice and Development   

Since achieving independence from colonial powers, African nations have struggled to develop effective governmental institutions that serve the needs of their people, rather than the whims of tyrannical, power-driven individuals. Over the past few decades, improvements in governance have occurred in many African nations, particularly in West Africa. However, several countries still suffer from an over dominant executive, one which seeks to control and marginalize other branches of government. Left with few outlets for justice and little access and control over government activities, populations have become increasingly reliant upon national and local media to keep their governments ‘honest’. The media’s importance in exposing government corruption and other misdeeds, keeping populations informed and serving as a voice for the oftentimes oppressed cannot be understated, particularly during times of civil and political strife .

Nowhere is the need for an independent and free media needed in Africa than in Zimbabwe, which after almost thirty years under the Mugabe dictatorship, may finally see tangible political reforms—if only under the thinly veiled guise of democracy. Since 2002, Mugabe has implemented a veritable shutdown of the media, ensuring total control over the flow of information, particularly during the 2008 elections when Mugabe and his Zanu-PF supporters carried out a violent campaign to oppress opposition party members and supporters. After a power-sharing deal was achieved in 2008 between Mugabe’s Zanu-PF and Tsvangirai’s MDC party—a dangerous precedent for African governance in and of itself—both parties were tasked with working together to implement real reforms in order to gain legitimacy and to eventually have sanctions by the EU and the US partially lifted. Greater media freedom and access was one of the new power-sharing government’s guarantees. However, impediments to such freedom still exist, one of which being the failure of the government to establish an independent and impartial Media Commission.

The problem that thus exists is that new privately-owned media organizations cannot obtain a license to operate without approval from the Zimbabwe Media Commission (ZMC), which has yet to be established, although board appointees have been made. In October 2009, Zimbabwe Minister of Information George Charamba had announced that the ZMC would only be officially established when all other proposed commissions (Human Rights, Anti-Corruption and Electoral Commissions) were ready to be formed. Furthermore, the government’s other media bodies (Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation and the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust), which regulate the vast state-owned media enterprise, continue to be controlled by Mugabe and the Zanu-PF. It has been reported that Mugabe recently made appointments of former military officials and spies to the boards of these media bodies, an apparent step to once again stymie impartiality and maintain significant media control. Another problem is that although the new ZMC is mandated by law to ensure greater media freedom, it will still be subject to the same laws and institutions that have worked to repress these freedoms in the past, particularly the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA). In addition, it doesn’t remove the influence of government over state-owned media and the information broadcast by such entities.

Under Mugabe’s reign, Zimbabwe’s civil institutions have always remained under threat of government reprisal; this includes the media, which has been predominantly government controlled since the establishment of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) in 1980. The ZBC currently operates the country’s only television and radio stations, under the umbrella of the also state-owned Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings (ZBH). During the 1990’s, however, Zimbabwe saw the expansion of its private media industry, which for the first time, provided the public an alternative to the government’s official take. Mugabe’s tolerance of more open media was short-lived however, as public discontent with his government and support for opposition parties, particularly the MDC began to grow. In 2001, with elections due within the year, Mugabe and the Zanu-PF began an oppressive campaign to silence the opposition; this included ensuring it had no voice within the media.

Mugabe’s crackdown on the media, beginning in 2001, was nothing short of draconian. In 2001, the Zanu-PF majority government passed the Broadcasting Services Act, which essentially prohibited the licensing of any other TV broadcasting agency by the ZBC. In practical terms, this meant that Joy TV, the only other television station in Zimbabwe, would lose its broadcasting license (Joy TV, a private television station, had initially leased its broadcast license from ZBC). Joy TV had been targeted by Mugabe’s regime for some time, as its popularity had grown and began to threaten the monopoly of ZBC. Joy TV was the only channel through which viewers could watch independent international news, the half-hour BBC world news. In fact, shortly before Joy TV was ordered off air in 2002, it had been instructed by the government to stop broadcasting BBC news.

The most significant blow to media freedom also came in 2002 with the passing of the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), a misnomer at best. The act established the Media and Information Commission (MIC), which was now given sole authority to grant or deny operating licenses to media outlets. All media organizations and journalists were now required to apply for a one-year renewable license in order to operate. In addition, under the AIPPA, all journalists had to be Zimbabwean citizens and foreign correspondents would only be permitted to cover special events. Perhaps most significant, the new law now gave the government authority to shut down any organization, or arrest and charge any journalist, if arbitrarily found to have written libelous reports. The establishment of the AIPPA, largely criticized both domestically and internationally, led to the shut down of several privately owned newspapers, all critical of Mugabe; these included the Daily News, The Weekly Times and the Tribune. In addition, the Financial Gazette, Daily Mirror and Sunday Mirror were essentially taken over by the government, when the papers were forcibly sold to the government intelligence agency, the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO). Furthermore, many journalists, who courageously continued to operate in such a volatile and dangerous environment, were arrested and charged with committing ‘libelous acts’, while others, such as Zimbabwe Independent and The Standard newspaper publisher, Trevor Ncube, saw their Zimbabwean citizenship challenged, in an attempt by the government to have more independent newspapers shut down.

To make matters worse, Mugabe’s government passed two more oppressive laws in 2002: the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the General Laws Amendment Act. POSA assigned unprecedented powers to the police in arresting anyone caught undermining the authority of the president, engendering hostility towards him or making abusive, obscene or false statements against him. The law gave authorities even greater latitude to arrest journalists and opposition leaders, who now risked jail or being beaten or tortured for speaking out against the president. Then, the General Laws Amendment Act amended the country’s Electoral Act, placing significant obstacles in the way of those registering to vote and significantly diminishing the role and reach of foreign and other independent monitors. This left the public and the press with even less protection during elections in 2002 and in 2008, during which Mugabe, security forces and pro-Zanu-Pf mobs unleashed a torrent of violence against the opposition.

 ?With the signing of the power-sharing deal in 2008, both parties were now tasked with ensuring a more open and freer media, but almost two years into the deal, there seems to be little palpable progress. Mugabe still controls appointments of the boards of the ZBC and all state-controlled newspapers; journalists continue to be arrested for reporting stories critical of government and police action, and new newspapers cannot launch because the ZMC has yet to be officially formed, another delay tactic on the part of Mugabe’s government. Interestingly, a new pro-Mugabe newspaper, H-Metro, which obtained its license from the now defunct MIC, well over six months ago, was able to launch recently. However, the law states that MIC licenses are no longer good if not used within six months, further evidence that circumstances continued to favor pro-Zanu-Pf media. With appointees already approved by all parties involved, there is no legitimate reason for the delay in establishing the ZMC. Hence, the ZMC should be immediately established. The Commission should be permitted to operate without influence by any one political party, but should act with impartiality, particularly when approving licenses for new media organizations as well as those shut down during past media crackdowns by the Mugabe government.

Now although obtaining an operating license is a necessary first step for the media to currently function, it alone cannot guarantee free and fair media access in the current political and legal environment. The influence of the government over various media boards, including the ZMMT, and the array of laws that provide government unqualified authority to arbitrarily arrest journalists, continue to undermine real media reform. The entire government-media system, which is quite intricate, is designed to ensure that Mugabe’s government retains control over a restricted media environment. Therefore, true reform will only come with a complete overhaul of the system, starting with the dismantling of the ZMMT, whose original purpose was to ensure an impartial media, but has effectively become the head of a propaganda machine for the government. No government should have majority stake in its country’s media; therefore, the government should sell the bulk of its media holdings, with each of the sales approved by an impartial and independent commission. This would free the boards of most media entities from government control and would allow for greater media expansion, particularly television and radio, which have suffered the most restriction.

Also critical to creating an environment that protects and values its media, is the repeal of the AIPPA, which has already been ruled by the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) as being contrary to the values upheld by the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, to which Zimbabwe is a signatory. Also significant, the ACHPR found compulsory licensing or accreditation of media organizations and journalists itself to be a restriction upon freedom of press and expression, so the legality of the ZMC and its authority to grant licenses has also been placed into question. In addition to a repeal of the AIPPA, the government should the Broadcasting Services Act, which places even greater restrictions upon the media and its ability to operate without government control. For instance, it states, rather ridiculously, that no individual shall own more than a 10 percent of a radio station. Another extremely oppressive law that must be repealed is POSA, which essentially serves as the base of this restrictive media regime. The act, which serves no legitimate purpose, has been used by police and government security forces to excessively curtail freedom of association, assembly, speech and expression. Although POSA is currently under review, the proposed amendment does little to erode the unconstitutional character of the act. Total repeal is the only guarantee that the government and police will not have justification to continue to act capriciously.

An assessment of the current government-media system in Zimbabwe reveals the difficulties with creating an environment that allows for greater media access and freedom. A free and fair media is essential however to ensuring the country’s democratic processes are also free and fair and that all parties are held accountable or their actions. To establish an open media, one free from government control, the separation of government powers, among the executive, legislature and judiciary, must be clearly delineated and upheld at all costs. In countries where the ruling government also has the legislative majority, it is through the judiciary that freedoms must be protected. Unfortunately, this is easier said than done, as strong and abusive executives rarely uphold the decisions of a weak judiciary. However, as is the case in Zimbabwe, continued international and regional pressure, as well as pressure from NGOs, human rights groups and domestic organizations, can influence governments, particularly when economic interests are being threatened. Therefore, it is imperative that the international community and regional powers persist with their demands for real reform in Zimbabwe, reform that promotes and protects a vigorous and open media. 

The IIJD has responded to the crisis in Somalia with the hope of galvanizing the international community to act toward sustainable peace in this region of East Africa. We call upon all those with the capacity for change in Somalia to take efforts toward a just and expedient solution to this bloody conflict.

UPDATED: The IIJD continues its call for action to release journalist Fatou Jaw Manneh, who was held by the Gambian government on charges of sedition after giving a critical interview accusing the president of inaction and betrayal. The day before her trial recommenced on June 27th, her charges were amended “to false publication with intent to cause alarm and fear in society and uttering seditious words.” This provides hope for those working to help Manneh, because according to The Gambia Echo, amending a charge translates to a lesser penalty in the case of conviction. However, this amendment also indicates foul play on the part of the prosecution that knows it cannot win on the original charges of sedition and so is moving to a misdemeanor charge that it feels it can win.

On June 27, the second prosecution witness, Mr. Basiru Gassama, completed his testimony against Manneh, reading excerpts of the interview for which Manneh was charged with sedition, citing her criticism and frustration with the Gambian president Yahya Jammeh and her insinuation that he should be replaced. However, it became apparent in his testimony that he did not posses the vocabulary necessary to understand the meaning of many of Manneh’s comments, and merely understood that she was criticizing his president in a way he didn’t agree with. In an important development, the judge in the Kanifing Magistrate’s Court has ruled that the charges brought against Manneh are offenses in the Gambia, and that it should be transferred from the Kanifing Magistrates’ Court to the Banjul Magistrate’s court according to the Daily Observer in Banjul. The Judge in Kanifing felt the jurisdiction of the Banjul Magistrate’s court is better equipped to hear the case because that is where the article was first read and where the sedition charge was first voiced. The trial continues in Banjul, and Fatou Jaw Manneh remains in the Gambia as her trial moves forward.

Click here to read the Letter to the Gambian Ambassador to the UN – April 2007

Click here for an update on the Freedom of Speech Tried in Gambia – May 2007

In light of recent developments after the elections in the DRC, the IIJD calls upon the international community to set high standards for future elections. Doing this will ensure that other countries will not have the same difficulties that the DRC is having right now.

The goal of the International Conference on the State of the Affairs of Africa was to discuss the root causes of Africa development crisis and set concrete priorities on how to resolve Africa’s persistent poverty. For this conference, the IIJD assembled a diverse group of more than 100 scholars, development professionals, community leaders, entrepreneurs, philanthropists, and members of the NGO community for the common purpose of addressing the challenges that beleaguer the lives of countless Africans. After three days of intensive and interactive debate and dialogue, participants identified and prioritized key development objectives. The following findings, resolutions, and recommendations are a summary of this dialogue and decision-making. They can be accessed by clicking on the below links.

ICSAA Preamble

ICSAA Findings

ICSAA Resolutions

ICSAA Recommendations

On February 18, 2010, Africa experienced yet another coup d’état, one of several to occur in just the past few years. A majority faction of Niger’s military, calling themselves the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy (CSRD), staged a military ‘coup’, deposing Niger’s controversial president and fledgling dictator, Mamadou Tandja, with the promise to restore the country’s recently dismantled democratic institutions. While many might simply dismiss the coup as yet another attempt to establish a more military-friendly dictatorship (in the name of so-called democracy), the circumstances surrounding this particular coup indicate otherwise, offering hope to the threatened democracy. In fact, recent political events in Niger have challenged all traditional notions of the African ‘coup’ and have also raised questions about the changing role of the military in African politics.

The Tandja Coup: From Democracy to Dictatorship

Although many are quick to criticize the CSRD’s actions, none can deny that it was recent actions taken by Tandja that had essentially destroyed the democratic character and foundation of Niger’s government. In fact, Tandja’s actions over the course of the last several months amounted to nothing less than a coup d’état, as every one of Niger’s democratic institutions was illegitimately dissolved and the country’s constitution rewritten to allow Tandja to stay in power, perhaps indefinitely. Tandja’s short-lived dictatorship began mid-2009 with his call to hold a referendum to adopt a new constitution, one which contained no presidential term limits. Tandja knew that he could not simply amend the 1999 constitution, because it explicitly prohibited amendment of the two-term limit (even by referendum); hence to do so would be a violation of the law as well as the oath he took on the Quran when first sworn into office. So, rather craftily, he proposed the creation of an entirely new constitution, hoping to avoid any legal or moral dispute.

Whatever unqualified attempts Tandja might have made at only slightly circumventing the law ended with his proposed referendum. After the Constitutional Court of Niger ruled three times that any such referendum would be unconstitutional, Tandja simply dissolved the Court by way of presidential decree, claiming it lacked the competence to judge such matters. Ironically, it was Tandja that had approved the judges’ original appointments. Under the constitution, the dissolution of the Court is strictly prohibited by anyone, including the president, and judges cannot be removed until the end of their six-year term, which would have been in 2012. By destroying one of the country’s central democratic institutions, Tandja revealed just how far he was willing to go to retain power, which is particularly unfortunate, given the Court’s demonstrated ability to uphold the law, even in the face of major political pressure from a powerful party.  

The Court was not the sole government body to fall victim to Tandja’s power grab. After the Court’s first ruling, Tandja once again invoked his executive powers and without any legal justification, dissolved The National Assembly, Niger’s parliament. With increasing parliamentary opposition to his referendum plan, Tandja ran the risk of being charged and tried for treason by the Assembly, through a specially formed ‘High Court’. With parliament dissolved and elections not due for three months, Tandja was now free to hold his referendum, with no further challenge or major consequence. However, breaks within his own party’s ranks as well as with major political allies such as the Democratic and Social Convention (CSD) party, proved problematic, especially after the CSD voiced strong opposition to the proposed referendum and announced the withdrawal of its eight ministers from the country’s government.

By June of 2009, Tandja had effectively dismantled both the judicial and legislative branches of government and was forced to replace members of the executive. In addition to that, weekly public protests against the proposed referendum as well as strikes by union and trade workers continued. In August, however, Tandja proceeded with the referendum, amidst the protest of thousands and without the participation of opposition parties, which had staged a boycott. Unfortunately, this left only Tandja supporters to vote. Many of these people, being poor and uneducated, were all too easily exploited by their leader, as he offered small bribes and additional promises of food and money to secure their vote. The result being that a new illegitimate constitution was passed, one that provided Tandja with sweeping new powers, including the power to appoint one-third of the parliament’s members and to establish a media oversight body with the authority to jail journalists deemed a threat to national security. Term limits were also completely abolished, veritably securing Tandja’s path to dictatorship.

Over the course of the next several months, Niger’s ECOWAS membership was suspended and sanctions against Niger subsequently put in place. The EU also suspended over US$600 million in annual budgetary support and development aid, and the US froze over US$50 million in non-humanitarian support. As Niger fell deeper into isolation, Tandja remained defiant in his endless pursuit of power. Tandja had proved himself willing to sacrifice not only the integrity of the country’s democratic institutions and processes, but also the health and well-being of his already impoverished and long-suffering people, all for the sake of his personal political ambitions.

The Military Coup: A Return to Democracy?

Shortly before the referendum, the private radio station, ‘Dounia’ was shut down by Tandja’s government, after reportedly calling upon military forces to stop obeying Tandja. Soon afterwards, military spokesman Colonel Goukoye Abdoulkarim, issued a statement, declaring the army’s continued neutrality during the country’s political impasse. The statement read, “Mindful of national unity, the defense forces do not serve partisan interests. Duty bound to be neutral and reserved, the armed forces cannot as such be associated with any political debate, or be involved in destabilizing actions.” Interestingly, calls for the military to intervene stemmed not only from private entities, but from civil society organizations and opposition leaders, some of which were arrested as a result. The military gained the public’s trust in 1999 when its intervention played a key role in establishing a democratic government, bringing stability to the country for the first time in decades.

The military’s refusal to intervene on the grounds of neutrality were at first questionable. Tandja himself had been a senior military officer, whose rise to power was largely the result of the 1999 military coup, leading most to conclude that his connection to the military, as well as its loyalty to him, was still arguably strong. Hence, the military’s initial complacence in the matter could certainly have been interpreted as tacit support. However, its refusal to intervene was also interpreted by many as an exercise in idealistic restraint. Senior military officers certainly had ample opportunity over the course of the past year to exploit government weaknesses, as well as the public’s discontent, to stage a coup from which they could have surely profited, as is the case currently in Guinea. However, the military did not act opportunistically, but instead chose to test the tenacity of the country’s civil institutions before intervening. This restraint is even more surprising given the impoverished state of the country, to which the army is certainly not immune.

On February 18, 2010, with Tandja’s new despotic government firmly in place and the country facing a dire humanitarian crisis, the military finally intervened, storming the presidential palace and deposing Tandja. Although immediately condemned by much of the international community (as is tradition), the actions of the CSRD were quickly praised by a significant majority of Niger’s public as well as the Coordination of Democratic Forces for the Republic (CFDR), a group comprised of opposition political parties, labor organizations and human rights groups, formed last year to protest and challenge Tandja’s plans for referendum. While it is difficult to ascertain CSRD’s true motives at this point, there is good reason for cautious optimism regarding its intentions.

First, the junta’s actions are an obvious response to the destruction of the state’s democratic institutions and the resulting civil strife. Also relevant is the make-up of the junta, the leader of which, Colonel Salou Djibo, is relatively unknown, but has had a distinguished career, which includes service as a UN peacekeeper in Cote D’Ivoire and the DRC. Sources have stated that the CSRD is essentially made up of a small, but powerful faction of the military that had become increasingly disillusioned with Tandja’s violation of the constitution. Some members have been educated abroad and have also studied human rights, a marked difference from the uneducated and oftentimes illiterate soldiers who have led African coups in the past. Also interesting, some of the CSRD’s leaders were participants in the 1999 coup, so, in deposing Tandja, the junta actually acted against a former ally, one of whom many in the military undoubtedly respect and share with an institutional loyalty. In addition, the fact that they were members of the 1999 coup, which first established democratic order in the country, bodes well for their stated intention to restore democracy.

A Call for Constitutional Order and Elections

In the past week, the junta has taken some steps to reassure the public, as well as the international community, that it does in fact intend to restore the country’s democracy. For instance, it has appointed an interim prime minister, a civilian, former Information Minister Mahamadou Danda. In addition, state institutions are now functioning, and most government ministers have returned to work, and business in the capital, as well as the rest of the country is proceeding without disruption. Furthermore, on February 26, the CSRD announced that no member of the junta, or the interim government that is currently being set up, will be permitted to run in the upcoming elections, further assurance that the junta’s leaders have no intent of seizing power for their own purposes.

In order for Niger to return to legitimate, democratic rule, constitutional order must be re-established. Therefore, the IIJD calls upon the CSRD and the interim government to immediately restore the 1999 constitution. The constitution imposed upon the country by Tandja in 2009 cannot be recognized as legitimate in any form, since its creation was the result of a coup, an unrepresentative and inherently flawed referendum. In addition to reestablishing the country’s 1999 constitution, an independent assessment of the executive powers under the constitution should be immediately conducted; the constitution should subsequently be amended to strengthen the separation of power between the executive, the legislative and the judicial branches of government. This includes applying stricter language regarding the president’s power to employ or rule by executive decree. The IIJD specifically believes that the constitution should explicitly prohibit the president from using executive decree to dissolve the country’s judicial branch (constitutional court) and the Legislative branch (National Assembly). Under no circumstances, should the president be permitted to dissolve either body. Furthermore, IIJD also calls upon the CSRD to immediately reinstate the National Assembly and constitutional court in its full form, prior to their dissolution by Tandja in 2009, as Tandja’s dissolution of the original bodies was illegal and objected to by the majority of Nigerians as well as the international community.

Unfortunately, the junta has yet to set a timetable for much needed elections, which are necessary to ensuring the government legitimately reflects the will of the people. Although Tandja acted illegally in rewriting the constitution, making the extension of his rule illegitimate, the junta too lacks any real legality in its rule. Therefore, it must immediately schedule a timetable for institutional reform followed by presidential elections. The elections must be fair and transparent and organized by an independent electoral body. Given Niger’s success with holding legitimate elections over the past ten years, this should not be an issue; however, the importance of transparency, particularly after a military coup, can never be overstated. Hence, the IIJD recommends that the CSRD and the interim government immediately initiate reforms and invite the international community, specifically the UN, to actively participate both in restoring constitutional order and in organizing and monitoring any upcoming elections.

The IIJD believes that in order for elections to be considered free, fair and legitimate, the following five factors must be present: an independent national electoral commission to carry out and monitor elections, a transparent electoral law recognized by all parties, free and open media coverage, free and unrestricted registration and voting access by the citizenry and finally, freedom of political candidates to campaign in all areas of the country. With these elements in place, Niger’s junta and its interim government will guarantee free and fair elections, ensuring results are justifiable and recognized by all. Most important, the junta will have fulfilled its promise to its people and to itself to restore Niger’s democracy, thereby providing its country with hope for a more successful future, one that benefits the ambitions of all. The IIJD is ready to provide its expertise and contribution in establishing a stronger and stable foundation that will propel Niger in the path of sustainable, democratic, and human development.

In 1994, Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela became the first democratically elected president of South Africa. Before that time, the National Party had ruled the country for nearly 50 years, imposing policies that guaranteed continued white domination. Mandela spent his early life mobilizing within the ANC, African National Congress, and after the National Parties banning of the congress, he went on the create the Umkhonto we Sizwe, a military wing of the ANC that advocated the use of violent tactics in their fight against apartheid. In his infamous “I am Prepared to Die” speech given to the Pretoria Supreme Court in 1964 Mandela states that “at the beginning of June 1961, after a long and anxious assessment of the South African situation, I, and some colleagues, came to the conclusion that as violence in this country was inevitable, it would be unrealistic and wrong for African leaders to continue preaching peace and non-violence at a time when the Government met our peaceful demands with force.” (Mandela) His connection to this organization would eventually lead to his imprisonment that would last for over a quarter of a century.

In February of 1990, Mandela was released from Victor Verster prison after 27 years behind bars. Opposition parties and ordinary citizens alike, marked Mandela’s release with great celebration, as his freedom would prove to jumpstart the continuation, and eventual end, of a long revolution against the ruling National Party’s apartheid policies. The month of February marked the 20-year anniversary of Mandela’s release, however, amidst the elation of his supporters, South Africa and her people are still struggling to remove the legacy of an era that the world has slowly grown to forget.

According to the U.S. Department of State, “since the abolition of apartheid, levels of political violence in South Africa have dropped dramatically” however, “violent crime and organized criminal activity are at high levels and are a grave concern.” They also state that “some members of the police commit abuses, and deaths in police custody as a result of excessive force remain a problem” and “violence against women and children also is a serious problem.” (http://www.state.gov) HIV and AIDS also continue to be a devastating problem within the country where, according to UNICEF, over 18% of the population, or 5.7 million people, is infected. (http://www.unicef.org). While steps have been taken to attempt to secure the future stability of the state and encourage development strategies that utilize democratic practices, many have been rejected for more short-term gains.

In 1996 the NCPS (National Crime Prevention Strategy), which recognized the National Growth and Development Strategy’s claim of, as Ted Legget states in “Just Another Miracle: A Decade of Crime and Justice in Democratic South Africa”, “the vital role safety plays in development,”(593) submitted a proposal to officials requesting that inter-departmental programs be aimed at increasing safety. The request was denied. Since then, few mentionable gains have been made. The international community has recently begun to focus attention on the South African situation, and with the 2010 World Cup scheduled to take place at destinations sprawling the map, many have begun to speculate the safety of tourists within a country that continues to boast astonishing crime rates.

Nelson Mandela won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993 for his work within a country that had been riddled with injustice since colonial times. His fight to end apartheid represents one of the most important battles in history for human rights, and will continue to be an inspiration to future generations as to how best to achieve a peaceful resolution to global indifference. The anniversary of his release form prison is indeed, a moment to be celebrated, however, there is still much work to be done, and the enemy continues to gain strength amidst our celebrations. We here at the International Institute for Justice and Development (IIJD) are fighting a battle against a level of poverty and injustice that many are not even capable of imagining. We believe it is most important to address the underlying causes of poverty and recognize the need for a change in the way development aid has been delivered over the past decade. The work that lies ahead is immeasurable and while Mandela retired from politics in 1999, it is vital to remember the words that led to the imprisonment of one of the most important figures in the fight for human rights; may they be our guide.

During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.
– (Mandela)

The International Institute for Justice and Development (IIJD), Inc. calls upon the United Nations and the international community to take a stronger stance against the undemocratic and illegal actions committed by President Tandja towards systematically dismantling Niger’s democratic institutions.

After adopting a new constitution in 1999 that established democratic institutions, President Tandja took office through generally fair and free elections – a milestone in Nigerien history. In the 2004 elections, a test of the new Nigerien democracy, voters chose President Tandja, making him the first democratically re-elected incumbent in the independent country.

The IIJD believes that the steps taken by President Tandja in recent months, however, have compromised his democratic credentials, undermined the legitimacy of his mandate, and betrayed the faith of the Nigerien people who twice elected him. President Tandja, nearing the end of his time in office, has sought to amend the constitution to abolish the limit on presidential terms, allowing him to rule indefinitely. Article 36 of the 1999 constitution specifically mandates that a president, elected for five-year terms, is eligible for only one re-election. Article 136 further specifies that “articles 36 and 141…of the present constitution cannot be subject to any revision.”

Upon being sworn in, President Tandja pledged to “respect and enforce respect for the constitution.” In 2007, the President interviewed with Le Monde and made it clear that he would “step down after his 2^nd term.” As late as March 2009, the President – in speaking with President Nicolas Sarkozy of France – reaffirmed that he would respect the current constitution and step down when his time in office expired in December 2009.

President Tandja’s actions since that time have clearly been unconstitutional and illegal. The Constitutional Court on May 25^th,2009 ruled that any referendum to create a new constitution would be unconstitutional. The next day, President Tandja dissolved the Parliament, becoming the de facto sole authority in Niger. On June 2^nd, he signed a decree appointing a committee of only a small handful of politicians to write a new constitution. The Constitutional Court twice more reaffirmed that a referendum seeking to amend presidential term limits would be illegal. On June 29^th, President Tandja dissolved the constitutional court. That same day, President Tandja invoked Article 53 and assumed emergency powers.

The IIJD is concerned by these recent actions that are reminiscent of Niger’s more authoritarian era. President Tandja’s drastic actions to stay in office have been accompanied by a blatant disregard for Nigerien civil society and far-ranging suppression of dissent. President Tandja’s administration has categorically ignored requests by the National bar association to respect the Constitutional Court rulings.  Women and independent journalists protesting the recent events were dispersed at various points leading up to the referendum. State media carried only pro-referendum and Tandja messages, while a private TV station that broadcast a message critical of the President was temporarily shut down. The Administration has ignored protests from the Democratic and Social Convention (CDS), a former coalition partner of President Tandja’s National Movement for the Development of Society (MNSD) in parliament. The CDS withdrew its eight ministers from the cabinet, calling upon the President to respect the Constitutional Court’s verdict. The international community must strongly oppose such actions and use its influence to restore democratic practices.

The democratic gains that Niger has made since being embroiled in an era of coups and re-coups have been worthy of praise and set an example for its neighbors. Recent events, which demonstrate disregard for the other branches of government and for democratic procedure, have compromised such gains and jeopardized Niger’s democratic legacy. President Tandja has severely weakened, and perhaps destroyed, the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary. In dissolving both the Parliament and Constitutional Court, he has disrupted the balance and separation of powers that the IIJD believes are integral to a stable and prosperous democracy. President Tandja’s referendum seeks to create an entirely new constitution written, not by a legislature, but by a five-person panel appointed by the President. If the results of the illegal referendum were to be upheld, it would allow President Tandja unchecked executive powers for an indefinite number of terms.

Niger is only one in a series of African countries in which the executive has flouted the constitution and the established democratic institutions in order to maintain power. The IIJD strongly believes that the United Nations, along with the rest of international community, must do everything in its power to ensure that Niger’s democratic gains are protected and that a strong message is delivered: countries that blatantly disregard their democratic principles will not be condoned nor ignored. Without action, Niger is heading back towards the instability that plagued its people in past decades. President Tandja’s administration is placing Niger’s peace, stability, and opportunity for possible long-term prosperity in severe jeopardy.

With Niger’s hard-won, yet still vulnerable democracy poised for possible destruction, the IIJD urges you to take firmer action to restore the constitution and its proper procedures.

With my highest esteem and sincere considerations,

Benjamin Ngachoko

President and CEO

International Institute for Justice and Development

The President of Liberia, her Excellency Ellen Jonhson Sirleaf talks about the importance of the work of the International Institute of Justice and Development (IIJD)in meeting the challenges Africa faces today.

We are writing to ask for your desperately needed help in response to the urgent threat to democracy that is currently occurring in Cameroon.  As Paul Biya continues to push for a modification to article 6.2 of the constitution that would allow him to extend his tenure beyond 2011 so too does the voice of the Cameroonian people clamour ever louder for permanent respite from his tyranny.

Greater pressure must be exerted by the international community on this corrupt government and it’s tyrannical leader to scrap their plans for modifying the constitution.  Biya has already revised the law once to extend his mandate; he will do it again to maintain his iron grip on power.

The demonstrations of the past couple of months following Biya’s initial proposal to modify the constitution in December are symptoms of the growing discontent of the people of Cameroon.  We have seen these demonstrations grow in strength and number, the most violent occurring just a few weeks ago before once again being suppressed by Biya’s brutal forces of order.  As his tyranny grows so too will the anger of the people; if democracy suffers another wounding blow the reaction will only grow ever stronger.  For this reason we implore you to heal these wounds before they become untreatable and the country descends into civil war.

Action on your part now will be far more achievable and far less costly as opposed to later intervention when matters have reached boiling point.  Please do not stand by to watch another potentially peaceful and prosperous African country go the way of her sisters.  International aid is already stretched to its limit; African soil is already saturated with blood.  Please intervene now before a flood of misery and destitution drains the life out of Cameroon.

Paul Biya has been in power since 1982.  In that time the economy’s growth rate has more than halved despite Cameroon’s wealth of natural resources.  He has plundered these resources for his own gain; he has brutally oppressed the people he should be protecting.  He is responsible for the destruction of his people’s freedoms and rights: the inalienable right of his people to free and fair elections, the right to free speech, the right to free and fair trials, the right to free movement and the right to life.  Paul Biya will continue to fight for power with more determination than ever.  If democracy prevails he knows that he shall be held accountable for his actions.

Hilaire Kamga, representative of the civil society platform and currently in the USA campaigning for Cameroon, is calling for an independent enquiry.  We at the IIJD fully support his call for a review, in line with the democratic process.  Kamga equally criticises those who believe that a change can only be brought about by violent means, by insurrection, revolution or even a coup d’état.  Such regime change is endemic to the history of modern Africa yet has rarely proven to yield positive change, merely replacing one violent regime with another.  It is not simply that the head of this corrupt system in Cameroon must go but that the whole system must change.  If not, a new man in power will become just as corrupt as the last, a victim to this untenable system.

Kamga says “We have to find the means of avoiding the worst by constructing realistic mechanisms that are efficient and credible, that may permit the citizens to find confidence in their country without being drawn into dead-end political options”

The only way to bring about real positive change in Cameroon is through democratic means.  A constitution should not be changed if it is to the detriment of democracy and the negation of the rights of the people, but to ensure the independence of the executive, legislative and justice branches of government, to ensure a free and fair legal system, to increase the transparency and accountability of the branches of government and to ensure the fundamental need for free, fair, and frequent elections.

When the system starts to function in a democratic manner it will become its own defense against corruption and tyranny.  We encourage an independent enquiry into the modification of the constitution and for a pressure to be put on Biya to call a halt to his project of tyranny.

We believe that the constitution of Cameroon is in need of modification but this must only be done in the interests of the people. The modification of article 6.2 will only allow Paul Biya to continue to plunder Cameroon for his own gain and continue to send Cameroon spiralling into the dark ages.  By continuing to provide financial aid to this regime foreign governments are only lining the pockets of corrupt government officials and paying for the brutal suppression of a people, smothering their calls for freedom and justice and precipitating the decline into poverty and misery. Action must be taken now.

If something is not done Cameroon will descend into civil war. If demonstrations have been violent before the change imagine the chaos if the change is implemented.  The people of Cameroon will not back down in their fight for a free and fair democracy and fair and transparent system of justice in their country.  We must ensure that their fight and their energy be a peaceful one to end this tale of woe.

Thank you for your commitment to this urgent issue

Yours Sincerely,

Benjamin Ngachoko

President and CEO

International Institute for Justice and Development

The IIJD calls upon the United Nations and the international community to recognize and take action on the alarming situation that is currently developing in Kenya. A country that was once a beacon for stable democracy and a model for economic progress is on the verge of a descent into poverty and developmental crisis due to the corruption and violence that has recently erupted there. Economists have made careful estimates that the crisis could as much as half the economic growth rate for the upcoming year, and with the violation of the basic human rights of all Kenyan citizens now imminently threatened, immediate action is necessary.

The recent developments in Zimbabwe have given rise to concern about human rights and the advancement of democracy in the country. The IIJD has been closely following the situation in Zimbabwe and calls for the stakeholders in the international community to take a stronger stance against the systematic dismantling of democratic processes and silencing of opposition by the Mugabe administration.

The IIJD has responded to the crisis in Somalia with the hope of galvanizing the international community to act toward sustainable peace in this region of East Africa. We call upon all those with the capacity for change in Somalia to take efforts toward a just and expedient solution to this bloody conflict

The IIJD calls upon the United Nations and the international community to recognize and take action on the alarming situation that is currently developing in the Central African Republic (CAR). For many years the CAR has been teetering on the edge of chaos and recent developments have only led to a more inevitable collapse. In a country now overrun with violence, fear and lawlessness, only a swift, deliberate and concentrated United Nations, African Union, and local government effort will be able to create peace and stability. With the lives of hundreds of thousands of Central Africans now in danger, immediate action is necessary.

UPDATED: The IIJD continues its call for action to release journalist Fatou Jaw Manneh, who was held by the Gambian government on charges of sedition after giving a critical interview accusing the president of inaction and betrayal. The day before her trial recommenced on June 27th, her charges were amended “to false publication with intent to cause alarm and fear in society and uttering seditious words.” This provides hope for those working to help Manneh, because according to The Gambia Echo, amending a charge translates to a lesser penalty in the case of conviction. However, this amendment also indicates foul play on the part of the prosecution that knows it cannot win on the original charges of sedition and so is moving to a misdemeanor charge that it feels it can win.

On June 27, the second prosecution witness, Mr. Basiru Gassama, completed his testimony against Manneh, reading excerpts of the interview for which Manneh was charged with sedition, citing her criticism and frustration with the Gambian president Yahya Jammeh and her insinuation that he should be replaced. However, it became apparent in his testimony that he did not posses the vocabulary necessary to understand the meaning of many of Manneh’s comments, and merely understood that she was criticizing his president in a way he didn’t agree with. In an important development, the judge in the Kanifing Magistrate’s Court has ruled that the charges brought against Manneh are offenses in the Gambia, and that it should be transferred from the Kanifing Magistrates’ Court to the Banjul Magistrate’s court according to the Daily Observer in Banjul. The Judge in Kanifing felt the jurisdiction of the Banjul Magistrate’s court is better equipped to hear the case because that is where the article was first read and where the sedition charge was first voiced. The trial continues in Banjul, and Fatou Jaw Manneh remains in the Gambia as her trial moves forward.

Click here to read the Letter to the Gambian Ambassador to the UN – April 2007

Click here for an update on the Freedom of Speech Tried in Gambia – May 2007

The goal of the International Conference on the State of the Affairs of Africa was to discuss the root causes of Africa development crisis and set concrete priorities on how to resolve Africa’s persistent poverty. For this conference, the IIJD assembled a diverse group of more than 100 scholars, development professionals, community leaders, entrepreneurs, philanthropists, and members of the NGO community for the common purpose of addressing the challenges that beleaguer the lives of countless Africans. After three days of intensive and interactive debate and dialogue, participants identified and prioritized key development objectives. The following findings, resolutions, and recommendations are a summary of this dialogue and decision-making. They can be accessed by clicking on the below links.

ICSAA Preamble

ICSAA Findings

ICSAA Resolutions

ICSAA Recommendations

In light of recent developments after the elections in the DRC, the IIJD calls upon the international community to set high standards for future elections. Doing this will ensure that other countries will not have the same difficulties that the DRC is having right now.

Read more about efforts to prevent destabilization in West Africa.

The IIJD has been closely monitoring the situation in Guinea – which threatens to destroy the fragile peace finally being enjoyed in West Africa – with growing concern. It is our sincere hope that those in a position to make a difference answer this Call for Action.

Click here to read more about efforts to prevent destabilization in West Africa.